Rached Tourki

Work place: Electronics and Micro-Electronics Laboratory (E. µ. E. L), Faculty of Sciences of Monastir, Tunisia



Research Interests: Software Construction, Computer systems and computational processes, Computer Architecture and Organization


Rached. Tourki was born in Tunis, on May 13 1948. He received the B.S. degree in Physics (Electronics option) from Tunis University, in 1970; the M.S. and the Doctorat de 3eme cycle in Electronics from Institut d'Electronique d'Orsay, Paris south University in 1971 and 1973 respectively. From 1973 to 1974 he served as microelectronics engineer in Thomson CSF. He received the Doctorat d'etat in Physics from Nice University in 1979. Since this date he has been professor in Microelectronics and Microprocessors with the physics department, Faculty of Sciences of Monastir. His current research interests include: Digital signal processing and hardware software codesign for rapid prototyping in telecommunications.

Author Articles
A Robust Fault Detection Scheme for the Advanced Encryption Standard

By Hassen Mestiri Noura Benhadjyoussef Mohsen Machhout Rached Tourki

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5815/ijcnis.2013.06.07, Pub. Date: 8 May 2013

Fault attacks are powerful and efficient cryptanalysis techniques to find the secret key of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm. These attacks are based on injecting faults into the structure of the AES to obtain the confidential information. To protect the AES implementation against these attacks, a number of countermeasures have been proposed.
In this paper, we propose a fault detection scheme for the Advanced Encryption Standard. We present its details implementation in each transformation of the AES. The simulation results show that the fault coverage achieves 99.999% for the proposed scheme. Moreover, the proposed fault detection scheme has been implemented on Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA. Its area overhead and frequency degradation have been compared and it is shown that the proposed scheme achieves a good performance in terms of area and frequency.

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A Comparative Study of Power Consumption Models for CPA Attack

By Hassen Mestiri Noura Benhadjyoussef Mohsen Machhout Rached Tourki

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5815/ijcnis.2013.03.03, Pub. Date: 8 Mar. 2013

Power analysis attacks are types of side channel attacks that are based on analyzing the power consumption of the cryptographic devices. Correlation power analysis is a powerful and efficient cryptanalytic technique. It exploits the linear relation between the predicted power consumption and the real power consumption of cryptographic devices in order to recover the correct key. The predicted power consumption is determined by using the appropriate consumption model. Until now, only a few models have been proposed and used.
In this paper, we describe the process to conduct the CPA attack against AES on SASEBO-GII board. We present a comparison between the Hamming Distance model and the Switching Distance model, in terms of number of power traces needed to recover the correct key using these models. The global successful rate achieves 100% at 11100 power traces. The power traces needed to recover the correct key have been decreased by 12.6% using a CPA attack with Switching Distance model.

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