A Comparative Study of Power Consumption Models for CPA Attack

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Hassen Mestiri 1,* Noura Benhadjyoussef 1 Mohsen Machhout 1 Rached Tourki 1

1. Electronics and Micro-Electronics Laboratory (E. ยต. E. L), Faculty of Sciences of Monastir, Tunisia

* Corresponding author.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5815/ijcnis.2013.03.03

Received: 10 May 2012 / Revised: 14 Sep. 2012 / Accepted: 5 Dec. 2012 / Published: 8 Mar. 2013

Index Terms

Correlation Power Analysis (CPA), Switching Distance model, Hamming Distance model, power consumption, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)


Power analysis attacks are types of side channel attacks that are based on analyzing the power consumption of the cryptographic devices. Correlation power analysis is a powerful and efficient cryptanalytic technique. It exploits the linear relation between the predicted power consumption and the real power consumption of cryptographic devices in order to recover the correct key. The predicted power consumption is determined by using the appropriate consumption model. Until now, only a few models have been proposed and used.
In this paper, we describe the process to conduct the CPA attack against AES on SASEBO-GII board. We present a comparison between the Hamming Distance model and the Switching Distance model, in terms of number of power traces needed to recover the correct key using these models. The global successful rate achieves 100% at 11100 power traces. The power traces needed to recover the correct key have been decreased by 12.6% using a CPA attack with Switching Distance model.

Cite This Paper

Hassen Mestiri, Noura Benhadjyoussef, Mohsen Machhout, Rached Tourki, "A Comparative Study of Power Consumption Models for CPA Attack", International Journal of Computer Network and Information Security(IJCNIS), vol.5, no.3, pp.25-31, 2013. DOI:10.5815/ijcnis.2013.03.03


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